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ONE STEP BEYOND? FROM SODEMARE TO DOCMORRIS: 
THE EU’S FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT CASE LAW CONCERNING 
HEALTHCARE
LEIGH HANCHER AND WOLF SAUTER*
1. Introduction
Although their national regulatory regimes differ widely, healthcare mar-
kets – like any other market in the EU – are ultimately shaped by the inter action 
between the forces of demand and supply. At the same time, demand and sup-
ply are relevant variables in terms of the EU legal regime, although so far not 
in equal measure. The advances made in the application of European free 
movement law to patients rights, enabling patients’ demand for cross-border 
access to various healthcare services (and goods) to be realized, is by now well 
documented. The Commission’s attempt to codify the Court’s patient mobility 
case law in the context of the Services Directive in 2004 may have backfired, 
given that it was forced to withdraw the relevant provisions in order to save 
the Directive itself.1 However, the extensive relevant case law of the European 
Courts from Kohll and Decker to Watts2 is now being codified (and extended) 
in the proposed Patients’ Rights Directive instead.3
* Both authors are affiliated with the Tilburg Law and Economics Centre (TILEC) and the 
law faculty of Tilburg University. In addition Leigh Hancher works for Allen & Overy LLP 
(Amsterdam) and Wolf Sauter for the Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa). All views expressed 
here are personal.
1. European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on services in the internal market 2004/0001 (COD) [SEC(2004) 21] COM(2004)2 
final/3, 5 March 2004, especially Art. 23 thereof. Cf. Directive 2006/123/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 12 Dec. 2006 on services in the internal market, O.J. 2006, 
L 376/36 (Services Directive), Art. 2(2) sub f, and the Preamble, recital 23. See more generally 
Davies, “The Services Directive: Extending the country of origin principle and reforming pub-
lic administration”, 32 EL Rev. (2007), 232.
2. Case C-158/96, Raymond Kohll v. Union des caisses de maladie, [1998] ECR I-1931; and 
Case C-120/95, Nicolas Decker v. Caisse de maladie des employés privés, [1998] ECR I-1831; 
Case C-372/04, The Queen, ex parte Yvonne Watts v. Bedford Primary Care Trust and Secretary 
of State for Health, [2006] ECR I-4325.
3. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the application 
of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare, COM(2008)414 final. Cf. Sauter, “The proposed 
Patients’ Rights Directive and the reform of (cross-border) healthcare in the European Union”, 
36 LIEI (2009), 109.
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 The case law reflecting the bearing of European law on the supply side – 
i.e. on the organization and delivery of healthcare and related intramural ser-
vices – is so far much less studied.4
 First, the right of health service providers to offer their services in compe-
tition with those provided in the patient’s home Member State by establishing 
themselves has not been comprehensively analysed.5
 Second, the possibilities for private investment in quasi-public or quasi-
privatized hospitals or clinics and to offer patients competitive healthcare 
remain to be considered in more detail.
 Third, the question arises whether national governments can continue to 
organize healthcare provision along public or non-profit lines and favour such 
provision with preferential access to public funding where non-profit and for-
profit provision coexists.
 The first of these three issues is the primary focus of this article, although 
the other two more complex issues are also touched upon. The starting point 
is that the Treaty rules on freedom of establishment are now generally inter-
preted as guaranteeing market access to all forms of transnational activity, 
including healthcare.6 Thus, the interpretation of the freedom of establishment 
has developed from the principle of national treatment to a dual criterion of 
measures affecting access to the market and/or effects-based discrimination.7 
 The relevance of this development in the recent case law is all the greater 
because, as a matter of EU law, although Member States are not obliged to lib-
eralize their healthcare sectors, turning back the clock becomes difficult.8 In 
the 2008 German hospital pharmacies case the Court explicitly embraced this 
“liberalization breeds liberalization” thesis by stating that: “… although the 
4. A noteworthy exception is Stöger, “The freedom of establishment and the market access 
of hospital operators”, (2006) EBLR, 1545. Cf. earlier Kaldellis, “Freedom of establishment ver-
sus freedom to provide services: an evaluation of the case-law developments in the area of indis-
tinctly applicable rules”, 28 LIEI (2001), 23.
5. The draft Patients’ Rights Directive only makes passing reference to this issue, as one of 
the four parts of the definition of cross-border services in recital 10 of its Preamble (alongside 
mobility of patients, mobility of healthcare providers and cross border provision of the service 
as in telemedicine).
6. Cf. in relation to establishment: Case C-442/02, CaixaBank France v. Ministère de 
l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie, [2004] ECR I-8961; Joined Cases C-94/04 & 
C-202/04, Federico Cipolla v. Rosaria Fazari, née Portolese (C-94/04) and Stefano Macrino 
and Claudia Capoparte v. Roberto Meloni (C-202/04), [2006] I-11421.
7. The argument is clearly reviewed by A.G. Tizzano in his Opionion in CaixaBank, cited 
supra note 6. He sets out how this is the same logic as that in the context of free movement in 
Joined Cases C-267 & C-268/91, Criminal proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mith-
ouard, [1993] ECR I-6097.
8. Case C-174/04, Commission v. Italy (voting rights), [2005] ECR I-4933; C-503/99, Com-
mission v. Belgium, [2002] ECR I-04809; Case E-2/06, EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Norway 
(waterfalls), judgment of 26 June 2007.
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Community rules on the free movement of goods do not require that it should 
be possible for all hospitals situated in Member States to obtain supplies of 
medicinal products from external pharmacies, when a Member State provides 
for such a possibility, it opens that activity to the market and is accordingly 
bound by Community rules.”9
 At the same time, as recent studies have observed, an important outcome of 
the lack of clarity concerning the impact of EU law on national health policies 
is the emergence of a leading, if controversial, role for the European Court of 
Justice in this policy field.10 This role becomes all the more prominent in sys-
tems which mix market and solidarity-based healthcare provision, and public 
and private financing. That involves not only conscious attempts at liberaliza-
tion, but also public systems which tolerate the emergence of parallel private 
initiatives in an attempt to meet pent-up demand.11
 Unlike the freedom to provide services in the context of the development 
of patients’ rights,12 recent case law concerning the supply side has not yet 
been discussed systematically. However, we believe this latest jurisprudence 
will become increasingly important to the course of healthcare liberalization 
and regulation markets across the EU.
 In this context, one line of recent case law, notably represented by Hart-
lauer in 2008, which concerned restrictions imposed under Austrian Law on 
the setting up of outpatient dental clinics suggests that where national mea-
sures are subjected to a consistency standard as part of the proportionality test, 
the scope for market access is (or could be) broadened.13 On the other hand 
9. Case C-141/07, Commission v. Germany (hospital pharmacies), judgment of 11 Sept. 
2008, nyr, para 41.
10. Hervey and McHale, Health Law and the European Union (Cambridge University Press, 
2004); Mossialos et al., Health systems Governance in Europe: the Role of Law and Policy 
(Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
11. One example where the two are compatible is provided by the risk equalization systems 
in Ireland and The Netherlands. This was examined in detail in Case T-289/03, British United 
Provident Association Ltd (BUPA) et al. v. Commission, [2008] ECR II-81. On solidarity more 
generally see: Newdick, “Citizenship, free movement and health care: Cementing individual 
rights by corroding social solidarity”, 43 CML Rev. (2006), 1645; Prosser, “Regulation and 
social solidarity”, 33 Journal of Law and Society (2006), 364.
12. Cf. e.g. Davies, “The effect of Mrs Watts trip to France on the National Health Service”, 
18 King’s Law Journal (2007), 158; van de Gronden, “Cross-border healthcare in the EU and the 
organization of the national health systems of the Member States: The dynamics resulting from 
the European Court of Justice’s free movement and competition law”, (2009) Wisconsin Inter-
national Law Journal, 705; Hatzopoulos, “Killing national health and insurance systems but 
healing patients? The European market for healthcare services after the judgments of the ECJ in 
Vanbraekel and Peerbooms”, 39 CML Rev. (2002), 683; Hervey, “The current legal framework 
on the right to seek healthcare abroad in the European Union”, 9 CYELS (2007), 261. 
13. Case C-169/07, Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Wiener Landesregierund and 
Oberösterreichischer Landesregierung, judgment of 10 March 2009, nyr. 
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not just the “notorious” 1997 Sodemare case but contemporary cases such as 
Doc Morris in 2009, on ownership rules for German pharmacies, show the 
Court is prepared to uphold obvious restrictions on the basis that the profit 
motive is inherently suspect in health markets.14 It is therefore valid to inquire 
what, if anything, has changed? 
 Meanwhile, in the abovementioned German hospital pharmacies case the 
“unity and balance” of the system was found to warrant similarly obvious 
restrictions. In view of these mixed signals, an analysis of the role of the Court 
concerning the freedom of establishment in the context of healthcare appears 
warranted.
 In particular it is useful to inquire why the Court has been prepared to sup-
port patient mobility and the right to freedom of choice in the health care sec-
tor, but has been reluctant to embrace the freedom of healthcare providers to 
compete across borders to widen that choice. At the level of justification, the 
protection of public health and the rights of Member States to determine the 
level of protection is frequently endorsed by the Courts. But does this mean 
that while it should remain uncontroverted that Member States have the right 
to regulate the quality of healthcare and its delivery, it must necessarily fol-
low that they should also have wide if not unlimited discretion to organize the 
means of delivery as well? The recent case law provides some clues in this 
respect. 
 The structure of the discussion is as follows. The next section of this arti-
cle provides context for the interpretation and potential scope of the freedom 
of establishment case law by looking at the Court’s approach to market access, 
and drawing a comparison with the application of the competition rules in this 
sector. The establishment healthcare case law of the Court is then reviewed in 
section 3. The section 4 focuses on suggestions for improvement, and for the 
introduction of a more economics based approach in this complex sector. 
Finally we draw some general conclusions.
2. Context
2.1. The current legal situation
This section examines the division of competences between the European and 
national levels to set out how the various Treaty rules can have impact on 
healthcare provision.
14. Case C-70/95, Sodemare SA, Anni Azzurri Holding SpA and Anni Azzurri Rezzato Srl v. 
Regione Lombardia, [1997] ECR I-3395; Joined Cases C-171/07 & C-172/07, Apothekerkam-
mer des Saarlandes et al. v. Deutscher Apothekerverband and Helga Neumann-Siewert v. Saar-
land (DocMorris), judgement of 19 May 2009, nyr. 
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2.1.1. Subsidiarity in healthcare
As Article 168 TFEU (ex 152 EC) reminds us, in principle the Member States 
are sovereign in matters of health. This sector-specific emphasis of the sub-
sidiarity principle appears to leave little scope for harmonization, and its appli-
cation is in line with the settled case law of the Court of Justice according to 
which Community law does not detract from the power of the Member States 
to organize their social security systems.15
 As the Court recently recalled in DocMorris – a case concerning the appli-
cation of Article 43 EC (now 49 TFEU) to Austrian legislation on the setting 
up and operation of outpatient dental clinics: “… it is for the Member States 
to determine the level of protection which they may wish to afford to public 
health and the way in which that level is to be achieved. Since the level may 
vary from one Member State to another, Member States must be allowed 
discretion.”16
 Similarly, in considering the scope for derogation from the rules on free 
movement, the Court refuses to read across jurisdictions to require Member 
States to follow their neighbours. Hence it stated in relation to the legality of 
restrictions imposed under Belgian law on optical testing in the 2001 Mac 
Quen case: “… the fact that one Member State imposes less strict rules than 
another Member State does not mean that the latter’s rules are disproportion-
ate and hence incompatible with Community law.”17
 The Court has repeated that, in the absence of harmonization, “Member 
States must be allowed a margin of appreciation,” to determine not just the 
level of protection but to some extent the means by which this is achieved.18 
Yet this wording may suggest a slightly less permissive approach than one 
based on “discretion”. And it does not necessarily give a free hand when it 
comes to the organization of healthcare delivery. As will become clear from 
15. Case 238/82, Duphar BV et al. v. The Netherlands, [1984] ECR 523, para 16; Joined 
Cases C-159/91 & C-160/91, Christian Poucet v. Assurances Générales de France and Caisse 
Mutuelle Régionale du Languedoc-Roussillon, [1993] I-637, para 6; Sodemare, cited supra note 
14, para 27; and Kohll, cited supra note 2, para 17.
16. DocMorris, cited supra note 14, para 19, with reference to Case C-322/01, Deutscher 
Apothekerverband eV v. 0800 DocMorris NV, Jacques Waterval (Deutscher Apothekerverband), 
[2003] ECR I-14887, para 103 as well as hospital pharmacies, cited supra note 9; and Hart-
lauer, cited supra note 13, para 30. For an earlier formulation cf. Case C-271/92, Laboratoire de 
Prothèses Oculaires v. Union Nationale des Syndicats d’Opticiens de France et al. (LPO), 
[1993] ECR I-2899, para 10; and Joined Cases C-1/90 & C-176/90, Aragonesa de Publicidad 
Exterior SA and Publivía SAE v. Departamento de Sanidad y Seguridad Social de la Generali-
tat de Cataluña, [1991] ECR I-4151, para 16.
17. Case C-108/96, Criminal proceedings against Dennis Mac Quen et al, [2001] ECR 
I-837, para 33, with reference to Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments, [1995] ECR I-1141, para 
51 and Case C-3/95, Reisebüro Broede, [1996] ECR I-6511, para 42.
18. Case C-110/05, Commission v. Italy (motorcycle trailers), judgment of 10 Feb. 2009, nyr, 
para 65. 
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the more detailed discussion of the case law below, the Member States are in 
any event allowed to determine the pace of liberalization (or indeed the lack 
thereof), as long as they do so in a consistent and systematic manner.19
 Although the organization of healthcare delivery is primarily a matter for 
the individual Member States, the sector is nonetheless subject to the Treaty 
rules on free movement and on competition, including the freedom of estab-
lishment.20 As a result of the gradual encroachment of these rules into national 
systems, it has become strikingly apparent that national healthcare systems – 
and their organization – are not immune from European law. A dozen years on 
from the landmark Decker and Kohll cases of 1997,21 the legal landscape has 
changed considerably on the demand side, with some hesitant and cautious 
shifts on the supply side, as explained below.
2.1.2. The market freedoms
Articles 56 and 57 TFEU (ex 49 and 50 EC) apply to freedom of services, 
allowing the patient to move to the provider or the provider to the patient, on 
a temporary basis. Consequently, either way, the health provider remains sub-
ject to the regulatory system of the Member State where it is established (the 
“home” Member State). A host Member State is not allowed to impose further 
restrictions on the service provider, as this would impose a double regulatory 
burden.22 If a healthcare provider wishes to move to another Member State on 
a more permanent basis, it can invoke Article 49 TFEU (ex 43 EC) on the right 
to freedom of establishment.23 This provision has considerable scope to impact 
on national regulatory regimes. As we shall illustrate, the concept of establish-
ment is broad and can range from starting up a biomedical laboratory to setting 
up a business as an optician, a pharmacy or a hospital facility. The test is 
whether there is a stable and continuous participation in the economic life of 
the Member States in question.24
19. Cf. Case C-500/06, Corporación Dermoestética SA v. To Me Group Advertising Media, 
judgment of 17 July 2008, nyr, para 39; Hartlauer, cited supra note 13, para 63.
20. The freedom of movement of workers will not be dealt with in this paper. 
21. Decker, cited supra note 2; Kohll, cited supra note 2.
22. Cf. Case C-496/01, Commission v. France (laboratories), [2004] ECR I-2351.
23. If they are normally provided for remuneration, then such services fall under the scope of 
the free movement rules, although this does not require direct payments in benefits in kind and 
NHS systems. Cf. Case C-157/99, B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v. Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and 
H.T.M. Peerbooms v. Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen), [2001] ECR I-5473; and Watts, 
cited supra note 2. 
24. Sodemare, cited supra note 14, para 24. The Court has also formulated the essence of Art. 
43 EC (now 49 TFEU) as “the actual pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed establish-
ment in another Member State for an indefinite period” in Case C-221/89, R. v. Secretary of State 
for Transport, ex parte Factortame (Factortame II), [1991] ECR I-3905, para 20. Thus cited in 
Barnard, The substantive law of the EU: The four freedoms, 2nd ed. (OUP, 2007), p 308. 
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 Before moving on to the evolution of the establishment case law of the 
Court, it is useful to consider briefly the relevance of the Treaty competition 
rules to the provision of healthcare and their limitations for tackling barriers 
to market entry in this sector.
2.2. The competition rules: Articles 101–108 TFEU (ex 81–88 EC) 
2.2.1. Application of the competition rules to the health sector
2.2.1.1. Ambiguity between solidarity and the market
The application of the competition rules to the health sector is a subject in its 
own right to which we cannot do justice here. Here we primarily aim to show 
the limits of these rules and to indicate why litigants are exploring alternative 
“lines of attack”. Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (ex 81 and 82 EC) essentially 
concern the behaviour of undertakings, while the rules on free movement and 
the State aid rules are primarily addressed to State measures. However, these 
are not entirely watertight categories – national rules and regulations may also 
be subject to the Treaty rules on competition, while the four freedoms may 
also apply to certain categories of non-State measure.25 Similarly the applica-
tion of horizontal direct effect – where private parties invoke the rules on free 
movement against each other – appears to be growing.26
 Competition law applies as soon as governments introduce a modicum of 
competition, i.e. mix markets and a solidarity-based approach to healthcare 
provision and its funding. At the same time, in the application of the compe-
tition rules to the health sector, the limited scope for competing private under-
takings operating in the sector has become evident. Prominent examples are 
the 2008 BUPA case, where an Irish risk equalization scheme between private 
health insurers was held not to constitute State aid by the Court of First 
Instance,27 and the Ambulanz Glöckner case of 2001, where awarding  exclusive 
25. Cf. Sauter and Schepel, State and market in European Union law: The public and private 
spheres of the Internal Market before the EU Courts (Cambridge University Press, 2009) and the 
references cited there. 
26. Cf. e.g. Case C-176/96, Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine ASBL v. 
Fédération Royale Belge des Sociétés de Basket-ball ASBL (FRBSB), [2000] ECR I-2681; Case 
36/74, B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v. Association Union cycliste internationale, Koninkli-
jke Nederlandsche Wielren Unie and Federación Española Ciclismo, [1974] ECR 1405; Case 
C-309/99, J. C. J. Wouters, J. W. Savelbergh and Price Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV v. 
Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, [2002] ECR I-1577; Joined Cases 
C-51/96 & C-191/97, Christelle Deliège v. Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées 
ASBL et al. (C-51/96) and François Pacquée (C-191/97), [2000] ECR I-2549; Case C-411/98, 
Angelo Ferlini v. Centre hospitalier de Luxembourg, [2000] ECR I-8081; and Case C-281/98, 
Roman Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, [2000] ECR I-4139.
27. BUPA, cited supra note 11. Noted by Sauter in 46 CML Rev. (2009), 269.
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rights to private ambulance services in the interest of universal service provi-
sion was in principle considered to be acceptable.28 
 At the same time, the dividing lines between solidarity based and market 
based health care provision are no longer clearly drawn, and as a result the 
boundaries of competition law remain untested in some important respects. 
For example, the interaction between public and private insurance is evolv-
ing: private health insurance is not necessarily a mere substitute for cover that 
would otherwise be provided by social security, but has an increasingly impor-
tant supplementary function. (For instance in Ireland, the supplementary pri-
vate health insurance services at issue in the BUPA case covered 50% of the 
population.)
 Despite this overall ambiguity, it is important to stress the basic distinction 
between public authorities and undertakings.
2.2.1.2. Public authorities and public and private rules
First, the organization of healthcare delivery (the supply side) is primarily 
determined by Member State rules and regulations. Obstacles to market access, 
entry barriers, are also likely to originate from these types of measures. In 
theory, the Treaty competition rules can be applied to the Member States’ rules 
and regulations, for instance if those rules confer an exclusive right on an 
undertaking which is unable to meet demand. The government rule in question 
could be challenged under the rules concerning exclusive rights and dominance 
abuse of Articles 106(1) TFEU (ex 86(1) EC) and 102 TFEU (ex 82 EC). 
Agreements between health professionals to organize access to treatment in a 
restrictive manner that are sanctioned by public regulation could also be chal-
lenged, (under certain conditions) under the combination of former Articles 3, 
5 and 10 EC in combination with Article 81 EC.29 The Court was reluctant to 
apply these provisions to the healthcare sector.30
 In the 2008 Belgian dentists case, a dentist established in Belgium had sub-
mitted before the national court that advertising is an indispensable instrument 
28. Case C-475/99, Firma Ambulanz Glöckner v. Landkreis Südwestpfalz, [2001] ECR 
I-8089.
29. Case 267/86, Pascal Van Eycke v. ASPA NV, [1988] ECR 4769; Case C-198/01, Consor-
zio Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF) v. Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, [2003] 
I-8055; Case C-35/99, Criminal proceedings against Manuele Arduino, [2002] I-1529. Arts. 3, 
5, 10 and 81 EC have all been replaced by different provisions in the TFEU and Arts. 4 and 5 
TEU.
30. Cf. Case C-446/05, Criminal proceedings against Ioannis Doulanis (Belgian dentists), 
[2008] ECR I-1377. In Case C-292/92, Ruth Hünermund and others v. Landesapothekerkammer 
Baden-Württemberg, [1993] ECR I-6787, self-regulation that barred pharmacists from adverti-
sing was found to constitute a “selling arrangement” and to fall outside the scope of Art. 28 EC 
(now 34 TFEU).
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for free economic competition.31 Hence, invoking the combined provisions of 
Articles 10 EC and 81 EC, he relied on the 1988 judgment Van Eycke32 to assert 
that – in view of the obligation upon the Member States not to introduce or 
maintain in force measures which may render ineffective the competition rules 
applicable to undertakings – the part of the criminal proceedings brought 
against him that related to advertising in healthcare matters was unfounded. 
The national court, in its reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling, relied 
on the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Pavlov, that “(O)wing to the 
heterogeneity of the professions and the specificities of the market in which 
they operate, it is necessary to assess, on a case by case basis, whether a restric-
tion of conduct leads in fact on the market in issue to a restriction on compe-
tition within the meaning of Article 81 EC”,33 when considered in the light of 
other Treaty provisions, such as Article 152 EC (now 168 TFEU) and Article 
153 EC (now 169 TFEU, as amended) on the protection of public health and 
consumer protection, respectively. 
 In its short judgment the Court had no hesitation in ruling that there was no 
link between legislation barring advertising for dental services and a private 
restrictive agreement.34
 Interestingly, in Belgian dentists, Advocate General Bot had taken the view 
that a ban on all advertising to promote the provision of healthcare services 
was liable to create a greater obstacle for professionals from other Member 
States than for those from the host Member State. A law of a Member State 
such as the Law of 1958 therefore constituted a restriction within the mean-
ing of Article 49 TFEU (ex 43 EC). However, he opined that the restriction 
was justified on the ground of the protection of public health: “… where the 
national legislation in question does not have the effect of prohibiting dental 
care providers from giving, in a telephone directory or other source of infor-
mation accessible by the public, basic details, free from enticements or incen-
tives, making known their existence as professionals, such as their name, the 
activities they are permitted to pursue, the place where they pursue them, their 
hours of business and their contact details.”35 The Court however did not 
31. Belgian dentists, cited supra note 30.
32. Van Eycke, cited supra note 29.
33. Opinion in Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98, Pavel Pavlov et al. v. Stichting Pen-
sioenfonds Medische Specialisten, [2000] ECR I-6451, para 89.
34. As the A.G. had confirmed there was no evidence in the documents before the Court to 
suggest that the law in question reinforced a pre-existing agreement and the referring court pro-
vided no indication as to the circumstances in which the Law of 1958 was adopted, which would 
have supported the assumption that Belgium had delegated to economic operators responsibility 
for taking a decision on advertising in the dental care sector and that the Law of 1958 simply 
codified that decision.
35. Opinion A.G. Bot in Belgian Dentists, cited supra note 30, para 124.
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 examine the application of Article 43 EC here at all. 
 Finally, as the application of Article 102 TFEU (ex 82 EC) to State rules 
and regulations in the context of liberalization of the various utility or network 
sectors – such as post, telecommunications and energy – has shown, in the 
absence of a process of harmonization, the Court is much more likely to defer 
to the Member State and apply the exemption provided by Article 106(2) TFEU 
(ex 86(2) EC) for services of general economic interest.36 Another relevant 
example is the sectoral occupational pension sector in the 1999 Albany case.37 
In other cases, notably Wouters in 2002, the Court has been even more defer-
ential to State-backed self-regulation by professional organizations.38
2.2.1.3. Undertakings
Second, the application of the competition rules is restricted to situations where 
“undertakings” are involved.39 As will be seen in the cases discussed below, 
in the health sector the Court has tended to construe this concept rather nar-
rowly. What is important is whether or not an entity is engaged in an economic 
activity.
 The main exclusion from the concept of economic activity from the 
 perspective of the healthcare sector is that of “organization based on social 
solidarity” – as opposed to being active in the market subject to competition.40 
This characteristic can feed through in the different functions in which an entity 
36. See e.g. Case C-157/94, Commission v. France (electricity and gas import/export 
licences), [1997] ECR I-5699, at para 115.
37. Case C-67/96, Albany International BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindus-
trie, [1999] ECR I-5751. Here the Court ruled that agreements concluded in the context of col-
lective negotiations between management and labour, in pursuit of social policy objectives such 
as the improvement of conditions of work and employment, must, by virtue of their nature and 
purpose, be regarded as falling outside the scope of Art. 85(1) EC (now 105(1) TFEU. 
38. Wouters, cited supra note 26.
39. In Albany, cited supra note 37, the Court held that a compulsory pension fund engaging 
in competition with insurance companies was an undertaking (paras. 72 et seq.) but exemptable 
on the basis of the exception for services of general economic interest in Art. 86(2) EC (now 
106(2) TFEU). The latter finding was based on the reasoning that otherwise risk selection would 
occur and the solidarity within the fund would be undermined. Similar reasoning applied in 
 relation to compulsory sickness insurance in Case 222-/98, Hendrik van der Woude v. Stichting 
Beatrixoord, [2000] ECR I-7111. By contrast, in Case C-350/07, Kattner Stahlbau GmbH v. 
Maschi nenbau- und Metall- Berufsgenossenschaft, judgment of 5 May 2009, nyr, the Court held 
that a (comparable) compulsory employers liability insurance association which is solidarity 
based and subject to State supervision is not an undertaking. (Even although potential competi-
tors from another Member State had made an offer to provide the services concerned). On the 
other hand, the Court also held that such rules might well be caught by Art. 56 (ex 49 EC) on the 
freedom to provide services.
40. Generally contrasted in this context are Case C-41/90, Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v. 
Macrotron GmbH, [1991] I-1979 (defining the concept of undertaking); and Poucet, cited supra 
note 15 (defining solidarity).
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is engaged. Thus in the 2004 AOK case, price fixing in relation to maximum 
reimbursements for pharmaceuticals by German health insurers fell outside 
the scope of competition law as they were not considered to be undertakings 
– in spite of the fact that the insurers competed on certain key parameters, such 
as the amount of contributions.41 Similarly in the 2006 FENIN case the Court 
held that Spanish healthcare management bodies were incapable of infringing 
Article 102 TFEU (ex 82 EC) in their role as purchasers because they could 
not be regarded as undertakings in their role as managers of the public health-
care system – and the two identities were not separable.42 The restriction in 
scope to undertakings applies equally to the Treaty State aid rules, as these 
rules only apply where a selective economic benefit (funded by State resources) 
is conferred upon an undertaking (as opposed to another part of the State).43 
 Hence which Treaty rules may or may not apply depends largely on national 
choices and the regulatory techniques used to implement them. So far the Euro-
pean precedents in this particular area of the law fail to map out a clear path 
(either for public or private actors). It cannot however be excluded that the 
concept of an undertaking may evolve further as the scope of both liberaliza-
tion and competition in national health sectors increase in tandem. 
2.2.2. The competition and the free movement rules compared – 
some essential procedural differences
2.2.2.1. The standard for free movement
As indicated in our introduction, the threshold for applying the free movement 
rules to healthcare appears now to be lower than that for the competition rules. 
The fact that the provision of healthcare is a service activity within the mean-
ing of the Treaties means that healthcare providers established in one Member 
State can exercise their fundamental freedom to establish themselves or provide 
services in another. The interpretation of what constitutes a barrier to free 
movement has been gradually extended to cover national measures which are 
not directly discriminatory (i.e. which expressly exclude or militate against 
service providers from other Member States) but which put domestic providers 
at an advantage. As restated recently in the 2009 Kattner case concerning the 
41. Joined Cases C-264, 306, 354 & 355/01, AOK Bundesverband et al. v. Ichthyol-Gesell-
schaft Cordes et al., [2004] ECR I-2493. The Court based its findings on the existence of a 
“Solidärgemeinschaft” in the form of risk equalization, and obligatory statutory benefits.
42. Case C-205/03 P, Federación Española de Empresas de Tecnología Sanitaria (FENIN) 
v. Commission, [2006] ECR I-6295. Conversely, medical specialists contributing to a single 
occupational pension fund were held to be acting as undertakings. Pavlov, cited supra note 33. 
This can be contrasted with a bolder approach by national authorities. Cf. that of the UK compe-
tition authority in Better Care, [2002] CAT 7, para 234.
43. Cf. BUPA, cited supra note 11.
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legality of compulsory accident insurance rules: “… the freedom to provide 
services requires not only the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of 
nationality against providers of services who are established in another Member 
State, but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without dis-
tinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member States, 
which is liable to prohibit, impede or render less advantageous the activities 
of a provider of services established in another Member State where he law-
fully provides similar services.”44  
 This interpretation of the scope of the free movement rules is in line with 
the earlier findings in Caixa Bank in 2004, and Cipolla in 2006. Market access, 
at the level of the provider of services or undertaking that intends to establish 
itself in a Member State, is the key issue in the context of non-discriminatory 
barriers.45 At the same time, as the Court has pointed out, blocking establish-
ment deprives consumers of greater choice.46 Consumer choice thus adds a 
second and even more powerful rationale for acting against non-discrimina-
tory measures that favour domestic incumbents. Provided, that is, that a patient 
can be regarded as a consumer – a view not shared by Advocate General Bot, 
as discussed further below (text at note 53).
 Furthermore, the Court has recognized that these Treaty articles may be 
invoked in certain horizontal situations: that is, in disputes between non-State 
actors and not just vertically, between a State and a market actor.47 Finally, in 
recent case law the Court has extended the reach of these rules into what might 
be termed internal situations so that if they could be invoked by an  undertaking 
from another Member State, home country nationals may also rely upon them.48
2.2.2.2. Advantages and disadvantages
These combined developments greatly enhance the potential attraction of using 
the market freedoms to challenge national rules (and/or related organizational 
arrangements) in relation to healthcare provision and its financing that consti-
tute entry barriers, and can also serve as a major source of market power for 
incumbent providers. At the same time, there are disadvantages to relying on 
free movement, which should not be overlooked.
44 Cf. Kattner, cited supra note 39, para 78 with reference to Case C-205/99, Asociación 
Profesional de Empresas Navieras de Líneas Regulares et al. v. Administración General del 
Estado (Analir), [2001] ECR I-1271, para 21; Cipolla, cited supra note 6, para 56; and Case 
C-208/05, ITC Innovative Technology Center GmbH v. Bundesagentur für Arbeit, [2007] ECR 
I-181, para 55.
45. CaixaBank, cited supra note 6, paras. 13–14.
46. Cipolla, cited supra note 6, paras. 59–60.
47. Cf. e.g. cases Lehtonen, Walrave and Koch, Wouters, Deliège, Ferlini and Angonese, all 
cited supra note 26.
48. Case C-451/03, Servizi ausiliari dottori commercialisti v. Calafiori, [2006] ECR I-2941.
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 A complaint to the Commission that a national rule violates Articles 49 or 
56 TFEU (ex 43 or 49 EC) may lead the Commission to open infringement 
proceedings against the offending Member State, and can eventually lead to 
the restrictions that were challenged being removed. However, this is invari-
ably a long and unpredictable process. The Commission has far more discre-
tion regarding these procedures and cannot be required to take a formal 
position on a complaint, as it is required to do under Regulation 1/2003 on the 
application of the competition rules.49 The final decision to proceed with 
infringement proceedings is inevitably a political one, and there are many rea-
sons (e.g. impending elections), which can dissuade the Commission from 
tackling sensitive cases.
2.2.2.3. The exceptions to free movement
Although there is a relatively low threshold for the application of the free 
movement rules, the EC Treaty is not to be seen as an instrument of deregula-
tion nor does it give prospective entrants unconditional access to any particular 
domestic healthcare market. Barriers to free movement can be maintained if 
these are in the public interest. Justification consists in meeting a four part test 
generally traced back to the 1995 Gebhard case.50 As long as, first, the measure 
is non-discriminatory and applies to domestic and non-domestic providers 
alike, and, second, is in pursuit of a legitimate (overriding reason of) public 
interest then, in the absence of harmonization at least, third, Member States 
have to prove that it is appropriate (or “suitable”) for ensuring the attainment 
of a public interest objective and, fourth, that it does not exceed what is 
 necessary to attain the objective (often framed as a test of whether the result 
can be achieved in a less restrictive way).
49. Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 Dec. 2002 on the implementation of the rules 
on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, O.J. 2003, L 1/1. However, the 
Commission may reject complaints based on the Automec case law of the CFI, assigning prior-
ity based on its assessment of the Community interest: Case T-64/89, Automec v. Commission, 
[1990] ECR II-367 and Case T-24/90, Automec v. Commission, [1992] ECR II-2223. Where the 
Commission rejects a complaint, the complainant is entitled to a decision of the Commission 
without prejudice to Art. 7(3) of Reg. 773/2004 (O.J. 2004, 123/18). See further the Commission 
Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC 
Treaty, O.J. 2004, C 101/05. 
50. Case C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procura-
tori di Milano (Gebhard), [1995] ECR I-4165, para 37, citing Case C-19/92, Kraus v. Land 
 Baden-Wuerttemberg (Kraus), [1993] ECR I-1663, para 32. This case law has been perceived as 
 revolutionary precisely since it brings non-discriminatory regulation within the scope of free 
movement. Cf. Spaventa, “From Gebhard to Carpenter: towards a (non-)economic European 
Constitution”, 41 CML Rev. (2004), 743; Barnard, op. cit. supra note 24, Ch. 13, freedom of 
establishment.
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 As we shall see in the discussion of the recent case law in section 3 below, 
this “public interest” test is frequently applied in a casuistic manner and often 
based on implicit and ready assumptions about the goals of the (national) sys-
tem in question, and the ways in which those goals can be pursued.51 These 
judicial assumptions are not subject to any form of economic testing as regards 
their plausibility (allowing e.g. the mere formal existence of deontology rules 
to become a trump card). This lack of regard for economic analysis is currently 
one of the most important areas of divergence between the free movement and 
the competition rules. 
2.2.2.4. The consumer interest
Another key difference is that in competition law the consumer interest (as 
opposed to the public interest) is now considered as the core objective to be 
pursued in the application of the Treaty rules. When applying economic con-
cepts developed in regulatory and competition theory, whether a particular 
national measure contributes to an objective of common or public interest is 
understood in terms of its contribution to overall welfare and efficiency. This 
economic approach offers useful insights into the aims and effects of regula-
tion. Because in this context the consumer interest is read as the interests of 
the consumer in general (i.e. the impact on the consumer surplus) this approach 
facilitates reliance on economic arguments to test assumptions, on a quantita-
tive as opposed to a purely formalistic basis, and has as such become a selling 
point for competition policy. 
 As this type of economic analysis has yet to find its way into the case law 
on free movement the interesting question is whether this type of approach 
could be transposed there? Could an economic analysis – even a cost/benefit 
analysis – provide at least a useful more objective check or benchmark for test-
ing assumptions about the public interest which are typically expressed in qual-
itative (if not subjective) terms? Or are we condemned to reason from an 
“individual choice equals individual rights” approach to the demand side of 
free movement, while on the supply side, the application of the four freedoms 
to support a right to compete on a market can be blocked on vaguely formu-
lated and untested public interest grounds?
 This is likely to be a tough issue because, whereas in the competition law 
context it is the private interests of producers and consumers that are balanced 
against one another in the context of Article 101(3) TFEU (ex 81(3) EC),52 in 
51. Cf point 89 of the Opinion of A.G. Jacobs in Pavlov, cited supra note 33, as cited there 
in the body of the text.
52. This is especially evident in the reasoning set out in the Commission’s 2004 Guidelines 
on the Application of Article 81(3) EC, O.J. 2004, C 101/98. “The first step is to assess whether 
an agreement between undertakings, which is capable of affecting trade between Member States, 
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the case law involving the application of the fundamental freedoms to the sup-
ply side, invariably it is a private interest in market access that has to be 
weighed against a public interest in regulation and its stated objectives (even 
if the latter has the effect of protecting an incumbent’s privileged position on 
that market). In this context, the party seeking market access is assumed to be 
driven by profit motives, which is seen as almost an automatic threat to the 
public values that national health sector regulation is expected to uphold. Obvi-
ously when a patient exercises her rights to choose a supplier, these assump-
tions do not readily come into play. It is assumed that choice in and of itself 
brings benefits. On the supply side, however, there is little attempt to demon-
strate whether market access or market exclusion can or could bring clear ben-
efits to consumers. Of course the very launching of such an exercise would 
require accepting that consumers are as such relevant here: not all agree. A 
good illustration of the difference in approach is again found in Opinion of 
Advocate General Bot in the 2008 Belgian dentists case:
“In the first place, healthcare services differ from other services. They af-
fect the physical integrity and psychological balance of the recipient. 
Moreover, a patient who avails himself of those services is responding to a 
genuine need related to the restoration of his health and, in some cases, the 
protection of his life. Bearing in mind the importance of what is thus at 
stake, when having to decide whether or not to avail himself of treatment, 
the patient does not have the same freedom of choice as he does with other 
services. When he avails himself of treatment, the patient is not satisfying 
a desire but responding to a need.
 In the second place, the dental care sector, as with all activities in the 
healthcare sector, is one in which, in my opinion, the degree of ‘asymme-
try of information’ between the provider and the recipient of the service, to 
adopt the expression used by the Commission in its abovementioned Re-
port on Competition in Professional Services, … is at its highest. This 
means that, in his area of activity, the service provider has a level of com-
petence which is very much higher than that of the recipient, so that the 
latter is not in a position to make a genuine assessment of the quality of the 
service he is purchasing.
 Consequently, taking into account that asymmetry in the level of com-
petence and the significance to the patient of the decision whether or not to 
avail himself of healthcare services, I consider that the relationship of trust 
between the patient and the healthcare professional is a vital one.”53
has an anti-competitive object or actual or potential anti-competitive effects. The second step, 
which only becomes relevant when an agreement is found to be restrictive of competition, is to 
determine the pro-competitive benefits produced by that agreement and to assess whether these 
pro-competitive effects outweigh the anti-competitive effects. The balancing of anticompetitive 
and pro-competitive effects is conducted exclusively within the framework laid down by Article 
81(3).” (para 11).
53. Opinion A.G. Bot in Belgian dentists, cited supra note 30, paras. 114–116.
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It is clear that a consumer-oriented view raises emotive issues in this sector. 
Should the patient be seen as something other than an ordinary consumer? 
Hence the importance that the Court assigns to prior harmonization when 
deciding its cases in a sensitive sector such as healthcare is perfectly under-
standable. Yet its undue deference to national “public interest” objectives might 
change if the benefits to the consumer interest – and indeed for public policy 
aims such as public health – were argued more forcefully in the context of 
defending the benefits as well as the costs of market access in economic terms. 
What standards are current arrangements actually held up to and what perfor-
mance do they provide? We would once again stress that it is not necessary to 
question the standard or level of health protection opted for by a Member State 
as such. It is however relevant to examine whether the organization of the 
national health sectors could still deliver the same level of protection even if 
it were provided by new entrants. We will now examine the recent case law in 
this light, and in more detail.
3. The recent case law on freedom of establishment in healthcare 
This section focuses on the application of the rules on freedom of establish-
ment in greater detail. As we have indicated in the introduction, the Court’s 
rulings in German hospital pharmacies, Hartlauer and DocMorris54 suggest 
that the contours of the application of these rules to the supply side of the 
healthcare market are emerging, and deserve closer analysis. Unlike the free-
dom to provide services in the context of the development of patients’ rights,55 
this case law has not yet been discussed systematically. However, we believe 
this latest jurisprudence will become increasingly important to the course of 
healthcare liberalization and regulation markets across the EU.
 Some two dozen cases where the freedom of establishment was invoked in 
the context of healthcare provision seem to have reached the Court of Justice. 
Of these, a number concern primarily the harmonization of professional qual-
ifications and are of less interest for the development of the interpretation of 
the freedom of establishment in healthcare.56 Likewise of limited interest are 
54. Commission v. Germany (hospital pharmacies), cited supra note 9; Hartlauer, cited 
supra note 13; DocMorris, cited supra note 14.
55. Cf. e.g. Davies, op. cit. supra note 12, 158; van de Gronden, op. cit. supra note 12, 705; 
Hatzopoulos, op. cit. supra note 12, 683; Hervey, op. cit. supra note 12, 261. 
56. E.g. Case C-319/92, Salomone Haim v. Kassenzahnärztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein 
(Haim I), [1994] I-425; Case C-154/93, Abdullah Tawil-Albertini v. Ministre des Affaires 
Sociales, [1994] ECR I-451; Case C-277/93, Commission v. Spain (stomatology), [1994] I-5515; 
Case C-424/97, Salomone Haim v. Kassenzahnärztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein (Haim II), 
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a couple of early cases where the “single practice rule” for doctors in France 
(in 1986) respectively doctors and dentists in Luxembourg (in 1992) was struck 
down with little difficulty on the part of the Court.57 “Continuity of care” was 
not held to merit a blanket prohibition and in particular the Luxembourg leg-
islation was internally inconsistent (a theme that would subsequently reappear 
in the 2008 case Dermoestética on the prohibition of television advertisements 
for medical treatments58). Other cases primarily concern the freedom to pro-
vide services and/or free movement of goods. Instead of discussing each of 
these cases separately, we will attempt to examine the relevant concepts from 
a transversal perspective, and analyse the conceptual developments in the case 
law from Sodemare to DocMorris.
3.1. Toward non-discriminatory restrictions
In its early case law applying Article 43 EC (now 49 TFEU) to healthcare the 
Court displayed a cautious if not conservative approach. Notably in Sodemare,59 
it departed from the Advocate General’s Opinion. It held that it was justified 
for a Luxembourg based for-profit undertaking to be denied public funding to 
run homes for the elderly in Italy. This ruling was based on the theory that the 
relevant legislation reserving participation in the State social welfare system 
to non-profit operators did not discriminate, because undertakings from other 
Member States were not in a worse situation than domestic for-profit under-
takings (which were likewise excluded). Yet if the only way to enter a market 
is to adopt the prevailing non-profit form of organization this creates an obvi-
ous disincentive. Entrants typically require outside investment, funds which 
they cannot hope to raise on a non-profit basis as investors will demand divi-
dends – which, at the same time, forms a guarantee that the investment will 
viable and that they will be efficient providers.
 In the subsequent decade the Court gradually departed from this narrow 
approach. This move is in line with the general trend in the free movement 
case law which already by the mid-1990s saw the Court condemning a wide 
range of national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise 
of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, and made these measures 
[2000] ECR I-5123; Case C-35/02, Landeszahnärztekammer Hessen v. Markus Vogel, [2003] 
ECR I-12229. A comparable case outside the context of harmonization but centred on a require-
ment to take experience acquired in other Member States into account is Case C-456/05, Com-
mission v. Germany (psychotherapists), [2007] ER I-10517.
57. Case 96/85, Commission v. France, [1986] ECR 1475; Case C-351/90, Commission v. 
Luxembourg, [1992] I-3945.
58. Dermoestética, cited supra note 19, para 39. 
59. Sodemare, cited supra note 14.
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subject to justification. In contrast to Article 56 TFEU (ex 49 EC) on the free-
dom to provide services, which can be used to challenge double regulation, 
Article 49 TFEU (ex 43 EC), on the freedom of establishment can be relied 
upon to challenge the very existence of regulatory measures, even if they lack 
any specific cross-border element.
 This trend in the case law implies a departure from, if not a reversal of Sode-
mare. It suggests that Member States no longer a priori have a wide margin 
of discretion to distinguish between profit or non-profit providers. Instead they 
will have to justify even non-discriminatory restrictions to the freedom of 
establishment – which will have to be both necessary to fulfil a public inter-
est objective and proportionate to this objective.
3.2. Proportionality – a cautious approach to justifying market access   
 barriers?
In sum, it is possible to conclude, first, that the Court readily finds breaches 
of the freedom of establishment in the healthcare sector, and second, that it 
will generally examine whether non-discriminatory regulatory entry barriers 
can be exempted based of the four-part Gebhard test. In order to be compatible 
with Articles 49 and 56 TFEU (ex 43 and 49 EC) such barriers must be (1) 
non-discriminatory; (2) justified by imperative requirements in the general 
interest; (3) suitable to attain their objective; and (4) necessary to do so.60 In 
the context of this test, the criteria of appropriateness (proportionality) and 
necessity are key. Here a strict (“least restrictive means”) test is sometimes 
applied, as in Greek opticians and German Psychotherapists, as well as in 
Hartlauer.61 In all three cases the national rules at issue related to the organi-
zation of the delivery of the service at issue. In all three cases, the Court held 
that the objectives of protecting public health while justifiable could be 
achieved by other means.
 Yet in its 2001 Mac Quen ruling the Court made three notable statements 
on proportionality in the context of the application of the free movement rules 
to the health sector.62 It recalled: “… that the fact that one Member State 
60. Ibid., para 25, citing Gebhard, cited supra note 50, para 37; Kraus, cited supra note 50, 
para 32; and Case C-243/01, Criminal proceedings against Piergiorgio Gambelli et al., [2003] 
ECR I-13031, paras. 64 and 65.
61. Respectively: Case C-140/03, Commission v. Greece (opticians), [2005] ECR I-3177; 
Commisson v. Germany, cited supra note 56; Hartlauer cited supra note 13.
62. Mac Quen, cited supra note 17. The Union Professionnelle Belge des Médecins Spécial-
istes en Ophtalmologie et Chirurgie Oculaire (Belgian Association of Ophthalmologists and Eye 
Surgeons) (“UPBMO”) lodged a complaint in Sept. 1991 against Grandvision (Mac Quen’s 
employer) alleging unlawful practice of medicine and use of misleading advertising, and 
appeared as the civil plaintiff in the criminal proceedings subsequently instituted against Mac 
Quen.
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imposes less strict rules than another Member State does not mean that the lat-
ter’s rules are disproportionate and hence incompatible with Community 
law”.63 Also it held: “(T)he mere fact that a Member State has chosen a sys-
tem of protection different from that adopted by another Member State can-
not affect the appraisal of the need for and the proportionality of the provisions 
adopted.”64 Finally, the Court held that the assessment of the risk to public 
health may change: “An assessment of this kind is liable to change with the 
passage of time, particularly as a sign of technical and scientific progress.”65 
With this guidance, the matter was referred back to the national court. Sub-
stantially the same reasoning was followed in Deutsche Paracelsus Schulen 
in 2002, where the Court found in favour of Austrian legislation blocking the 
training of lay medical practitioners that was legal in Germany (as was lay 
medical practice itself).66
 The assertion that the existence of differing types of restrictions in differ-
ent Member States does not prejudice their proportionality seems mistaken. It 
is not contested here that it is up to the Member States to decide the level of 
health protection they wish to provide for their citizens. The restrictions they 
impose have to be proportionate in that specific context. However this does 
not require complete exclusion of the potential benefits of reading across expe-
riences from other jurisdictions. If a less restrictive means is shown to be effec-
tive in attaining the same or even a higher level of protection this should be at 
least relevant to the proportionality test, even if is not necessarily conclusive.
3.3. Appropriateness and necessity
In the Greek Opticians case, decided in 2005, the Commission challenged as 
an infringement of Article 43 EC (now 49 TFEU) a Greek measure imposing 
a requirement that only authorized opticians could own and operate optician’s 
shops, that they had to provide a minimum of 50 percent of the capital and 
could only participate in a maximum of two shops (provided both shops were 
in the name of separate authorized opticians).67 The Court held that the objec-
tive of protecting the public health could equally well have been obtained by 
requiring the presence of qualified salaried opticians or associates in each 
63. Mac Quen, cited supra note 17, para 33, with reference to Alpine Investments, cited 
supra note 17, para 51; and Reisebüro Broede, cited supra note 17, para 42.
64. Mac Quen, cited supra note 17, para 34, with reference to Case C-67/98, Questore di 
Verona v. Diego Zenatti, [1999] ECR I-7289, para 34.
65. Ibid., para 36.
66. Case C-294/00, Deutsche Paracelsus Schulen für Naturheilverfahren GmbH v. Kurt 
Gräbner, [2002] ECR I-6515.
67. Cited supra note 61.
136  Hancher and Sauter CML Rev. 2010
 optician’s shop (as well as rules for civil liability and requiring professional 
indemnity insurance), and so the restriction was found to go beyond what was 
necessary: i.e. to be disproportionate. The Court thus used a least restrictive 
means test. And it clearly recognized that a particular form of organization was 
not necessarily the only way to deliver the required level of protection of the 
consumer.
 Hartlauer, decided in 2009, concerned a reference from the Austrian admin-
istrative court relating to the refusal of regional governments in Austria to give 
the Hartlauer corporation permission to set up and operate independent out-
patient dental clinics in the regions of Vienna and Oberösterreich.68 Accord-
ing to the relevant national legislation, authorization of a health institution 
required taking into account vested interests (established dentists) who were 
already contracted by sickness funds in determining whether there was a need.69 
The Court found there was a clear form of discrimination because group prac-
tices were allowed to be established without any form of prior authorization 
whereas they offered the same services as outpatient clinics. Moreover they 
were likely to give rise to the same objections, if these were to be taken seri-
ously. Hence the Court held: “In those circumstances it must be concluded that 
the national legislation at issue … does not pursue the stated objectives in a 
consistent and systematic manner”.70
 This develops the “consistency” criterion that was first used in the Italian 
Dermoestética case and forms a counterpoint to the “unity and balance of the 
system” in the German hospital pharmacies case as well (both decided in 
2008). In Demoestética national advertising for medical treatments was pro-
hibited, yet regional and local broadcasting was allowed. According to the 
Court “… such rules exhibit an inconsistency which the Italian Government 
has not attempted to justify and cannot therefore properly attain the public 
health objective which they seek to pursue”.71 This consistency requirement 
68. Hartlauer, cited supra note 13. Cf. Case C-531/06, Commission v. Italy (Italian pharma-
cists), judgment of 19 May 2009, nyr. 
69. On 29 August 2001 the Wiener Landesregierung rejected the application by Hartlauer, a 
company established in Germany, for authorization to set up a private health institution in the 
form of an outpatient dental clinic in the Vienna. The Wiener Landesregierung based its decision 
on applicable State law and a report produced by an official medical expert. According to the 
report, dental care was adequately ensured in Vienna by public and private non-profit-making 
health institutions and other contractual practitioners offering comparable services. On similar 
grounds, the Oberösterreichische Landesregierung on 20 Sept. 2006 rejected Hartlauer’s appli-
cation for authorization to set up an outpatient dental clinic in Wels. Hartlauer brought proceed-
ings against those decisions before the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Administrative Court), which 
joined the two cases.
70. Hartlauer, cited supra note 13, para 63 (emphasis added).
71. Dermoestética, cited supra note 19, para 39, emphasis added. (Cf. Joined Cases C-338/04, 
C-359/04 & C-360/04, Criminal proceedings against Placanica et al., [2007] ECR I-1891, 
para 53.)
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potentially allows entrants to confront and condemn protectionist regulation 
with internal contradictions.
 In other cases, though, the Court declines to submit national regulation to 
a stricter test of appropriateness in the context of Gebhard, as recently con-
firmed, for example, in German Hospital pharmacies as well as Italian phar-
macists and DocMorris. In these cases the application of the public interest 
exception was not seriously examined on its merits. No accountability to pub-
lic standards is required nor is evidence of any kind in terms of actual results. 
Nor is an economic analysis (e.g. in a cost versus benefits sense) performed: 
instead unsubstantiated claims are put forward that entrants driven by the profit 
motive are liable to exploit their consumers and even damage their health while 
depleting healthcare financing in the process. Thus in German hospital phar-
macies the Court, without much by way of reasoning, held that the contested 
legal provisions which made it impossible for German hospitals to be supplied 
by pharmacies outside Germany: “… ensure that all the elements of the sys-
tem for the supply of medicinal products to hospitals in Germany are equiva-
lent and mutually compatible, and thereby guarantee the unity and balance of 
that system.”72 Consequently, the Court held the German system “clearly” does 
not go beyond what is necessary. In addition it pointed out that the system pro-
posed by the Commission (with separate supplying and monitoring pharma-
cies) would be financially wasteful. The Court then went on to emphasize, 
first, the need for planning the hospital system, and secondly, avoiding finan-
cial waste.73 The Commission, needless to say, lost the case.
 Superficially, the “unity and balance” of the system may appear something 
akin to the “consistency” criterion in Dermoestética and Hartlauer, or the 
financial balance of the medical systems in the earlier patient mobility cases, 
and a reasonable enough standard. However, it is by no means evident why 
the process of contracting for medicines through in situ pharmacists by indi-
vidual hospitals should be seen as forming part of a system that required coher-
ence and balance: the hospitals concerned do not depend on each other in a 
relevant manner in this context, financially or otherwise. For the same reason, 
planning was in no way affected – nor was any evidence presented that in Ger-
many planning of hospitals’ spatial or geographical distribution is relevant to 
the case (or for that matter actually takes place). In other words: there simply 
is no system here that requires unity and balance.
72. Commission v. Germany (hospital pharmacies), cited supra note 9, para 56.
73. Referring to Smits and Peerbooms, cited supra note 23; Case C-385/99, V.G. Müller-
Fauré v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA and E.E.M. van Riet v. 
Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO Zorgverzekeringen, [2003] ECR I-4509; and Watts, 
cited supra note 2.
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 On a more positive reading, this judgment could be seen as allowing a Mem-
ber State to plan a gradual reorganization (e.g. to move former internal ser-
vices to an external setting) without the risk of having that controlled 
transformation threatened by the free movement rules and the barbarians at 
the gate. At the same time, the Court gave little credence to the Commission’s 
attempts to demonstrate that public health objectives need not have been put 
at risk if the requirement that the pharmacist should be local had been elimi-
nated, and that other measures were realistically possible and would not have 
imposed unnecessary costs on the system. The ruling therefore appears to be 
based on the implicit assumption that if a system of organization of certain 
health care activities is inextricably linked with a certain standard or level of 
protection, then any further attempted analysis of the different components of 
that system can be avoided by assuming a need for unity and balance.
3.4. Towards a more nuanced approach in Doc Morris? 
In its 2009 DocMorris ruling the Court looked at whether it was appropriate 
to exclude non-pharmacists from ownership of a pharmacy. In doing so it dis-
tinguished pharmaceuticals from other goods stating that:
(1)  unnecessary or incorrect consumption of medicinal products could cause 
serious harm to health; and 
(2)  overconsumption or incorrect use of medication could lead to the waste of 
financial resources.
In this context, the Court held: “… it must be accepted that Member States 
may require that medicinal products be supplied by pharmacists enjoying genu-
ine professional independence. They may also take measures which are capable 
of eliminating or reducing a risk that that independence will be prejudiced 
because such prejudice would be liable to affect the degree to which the provi-
sion of medicinal products to the public is reliable and of good quality.”74 
As an aside it might be remarked that this appears a quixotic view in a 
world where industry payments and bonuses to “independent” pharmacists 
account for a not insignificant part of their income – at least in some Member 
States.75 Meanwhile significant unexplained price differentials persist be-
tween EU countries alongside divergent national consumption patterns of 
74. DocMorris, cited supra note 14, para 35.
75. E.g. in the Netherlands these account for up to 20% of pharmacists’ income and in total 
over €500 million for 2007. Douven and Meijer, Prijsvorming van generieke geneesmiddelen: 
forse prijsdalingen in het nieuwe zorgstelsel, CBP Document No. 175, Nov. 2008.
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 pharmaceuticals.76 More importantly entrants have every incentive not to cause 
serious harm to health or waste financial resources, as their business would 
otherwise surely fail. Nor was any proof supplied that the national system in 
fact delivers better (or for that matter any particular) results.
 Next, the Court pursued the theme of professional independence: “It is unde-
niable that an operator having the status of pharmacist pursues, like other per-
sons, the objective of making a profit. However, as a pharmacist by profession, 
he is presumed to operate the pharmacy not with a purely economic objective, 
but also from a professional viewpoint.”77 It also held that for pharmacist-own-
ers “the making of a profit is tempered” whereas it is not for pharmacists who 
are employed. According to the Court, non-pharmacists by definition do not 
provide the same safeguards. On the facts of the case this is odd, because Doc-
Morris had been licensed precisely to own a pharmacy operated by a pharma-
cist – just not owned by him. It could just as well be argued that being freed 
from the burden of financial responsibility better enabled this pharmacist to 
live up to deontological standards. Moreover it is not clear why adequate alter-
native safeguards could not replace the presence of an owner/pharmacist on 
the premises.
 Significantly, and as in the earlier Italian pharmacies case,78 the Court 
explicitly pointed out the analogy with social welfare services in Sodemare to 
the effect that:
“… unlike the case of a pharmacy operated by a pharmacist, the operation 
of a pharmacy by a non-pharmacist may represent a risk to public health, 
in particular to the reliability and quality of the supply of medicinal 
 products at retail level, because the pursuit of profit in the course of such 
operation does not involve moderating factors such as those, noted in 
 paragraph 37 of the present judgment, which characterise the activity of 
pharmacists (see by analogy, with regard to the provision of social welfare 
services Case C-70/95 Sodemare and Others [1997] ECR I-3395, para 
32).”79
The Court then also listed some of the practices of which pharmacists who 
were not themselves owners might, in its eyes, be guilty:
76. E.g. Danzon and Furukawa, “Prices and availability of pharmaceuticals: Evidence from 
nine countries”, (2004) Health Affairs, 521; Vaccheri et al., “Antibiotic prescribing in general 
practice: striking differences between Italy (Ravenna) and Denmark (Funen)”, 50 Journal of 
Antimicrobial Chemotherapy (2002), 989.
77. DocMorris, cited supra note 14, para 37.
78. Italian pharmacists, cited supra note 68, para 63.
79. DocMorris, cited supra note 14, para 39. 
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– manufacturers or wholesalers might encourage them to promote the medic-
inal products which they produce or market themselves;
– they might be encouraged to sell off medicinal products which it is no lon-
ger profitable to keep in stock.
The arguments of DocMorris and the Commission that the public interest 
objective was pursued in an inconsistent manner (e.g. in view of the rule that 
a single pharmacist could own and operate as many as three pharmacies, and 
that hospitals were allowed to employ in-house pharmacists) were rejected. 
Here too, the Court vented implicit accusations: “… having regard to the fact 
that those hospitals provide medical care, there are no grounds for assuming 
that they would have an interest in making a profit to the detriment of the 
patients for whom the medicinal products of the pharmacies which they house 
are intended.”80 This is an odd observation: as if other parties would have an 
interest in making profits to the patients’ detriment – surely, at least in the long 
run, this would make no business sense, because they would lose their custom-
ers, and thereby their market and their business.
 Finally the Court examined the fourth element, that of necessity. It rejected 
the possibility of relying on an employed pharmacist operating the premises: 
“… there is a risk that legislative rules designed to ensure the professional 
independence of pharmacists would not be observed in practice, given that the 
interest of a non-pharmacist in making a profit would not be tempered in a 
manner equivalent to that of self-employed pharmacists and that the fact that 
pharmacists, when employees, work under an operator could make it difficult 
for them to oppose instructions given by him.”81
 Consequently, the Court found the measure necessary. It distinguished this 
case from the 2005 Greek Opticians case because the potential harm to health 
and risk of waste of financial resources in the case of medicinal products was 
much greater (than in the case of opticians).82
 It is to be regretted that the issue of the organization of healthcare and its 
delivery as opposed to the desired level of protection remain in the final event 
muddled in the DocMorris ruling. Protecting entrenched professional interests 
(i.e. on the basis of who provides the treatment as opposed to the standard of 
treatment) is an odd way of guaranteeing the public interest, especially where 
the latter is not clearly defined. Nowhere in the ruling is there any suggestion 
that such schemes should be judged not only based on their claims or good 
intentions, but on the merits, i.e. in terms of specific obligations and verifiable 
80. Ibid., para 48.
81. Ibid., para 54.
82. Commission v. Greece (opticians), cited supra note 61. 
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performance measures. In terms of a more economic approach, the latter would 
be unavoidable. Moreover the notion of the pharmacist directly employed by 
the pharmaceutical industry is a red herring: this was not the business model 
that DocMorris proposed to use. 
 Nevertheless we would argue that it should be recognized that the DocMor-
ris case is not a complete return to the restricted Sodemare approach. Instead 
of ruling that no breach of Article 43 EC existed, here the Gebhard test is 
applied in full. This can be seen as a first step toward testing the rationality 
and consistency of the public policy in question: “one step beyond”.
3.5. Patient mobility versus establishment
It is also evident that the Court’s approach to patient mobility in its extensive 
jurisprudence on this matter83 diverges from that concerning freedom of estab-
lishment in healthcare. Although in both lines of cases broadly the same types 
of “public interest” exceptions are invoked, in the patient mobility cases these 
are trumped by procedural and material guarantees designed to protect the 
individual patient (or: individual patients’ rights and the right of choice). A 
similar logic does not exist in the establishment context, when freedom of 
market access and inevitably competition are at stake. There appears to be 
limited appreciation or scope for the possibility that the freedom of establish-
ment can stimulate efficient market entry, spreading best practices throughout 
the EU, and hence potential healthcare improvements which could also be to 
the benefit of patients and patients’ choice.
3.6. Financial versus regulatory issues 
To date, the ruling in Sodemare is one of the few establishment cases touching 
on reimbursement while the majority of the remaining cases deal with health 
standards. The main exception is Hartlauer where the Court considers the 
threats of supply induced demand (even although the pharmacists’ cases touch 
on this implicitly too) to the coherence of the system. In Hartlauer, the Court 
took a strict line and found no threat to the coherence of the system at issue. 
In those cases where it decides primarily on the public interest to maintain 
health standards (often by reference to the services of practitioners belonging 
to a specific medical profession, or to self-regulation by such professions), the 
83. For a detailed discussion of the services cases and further references see Sauter, TILEC 
Discussion Paper No. 2008–034, available at SSRN: <ssrn.com/abstract=1277110>; for more on 
free movement of services and goods in an establishment context see Hancher and Sauter, 
TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2009–28, available at SSRN: <ssrn.com/abstract=1429315>.
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Court regrettably tends to confine its analysis to the necessity and appropriate-
ness of such formal qualifications, as opposed to going on to examine their 
wider effects on the supply or organizational side of health provision.
4. Suggestions for a law and economics oriented approach
We respectfully submit that the limits of the logic applied by the Court in the 
recent establishment cases, especially Italian pharmacists and DocMorris as 
well as the related German hospital pharmacies case, appear to be in sight, 
and it would be regrettable if further developments were stifled by this. Below 
we set out what we suggest could be key ingredients for building on the Court’s 
approach so far.
4.1. The public interest test
Article 52(1) TFEU (ex 46(1) EC) provides an explicit derogation in respect 
of public health. This provision does not permit wholesale exclusion of the 
health sector, as we have seen in the case law discussed in the preceding sec-
tions, but the Court has been cautious and endorsed restrictive measures as 
necessary for the objective of maintaining a balanced medical and hospital 
service open to all, or to secure access to a treatment facility or to a medical 
competence within a national territory that is essential for the public health 
and even the survival of the population.84 In addition, the Court has developed 
various imperative requirements to justify non-discriminatory measures that 
serve the public interest. A growing list of public interest objectives have been 
developed in this context. These include the need to avoid financial imbalance 
or to prevent over-capacity in the system.85 The need for detailed planning, for 
example, is generally acknowledged (even in cases where it might seem rather 
implausible that such planning in fact occurs or is important). Although the 
Court has repeatedly held that the Treaty exceptions cannot be invoked to jus-
tify economic objectives, in practice economic instruments and controls are 
84. Note these are also the categories used by the Court in its services case law. Cf. Art. 8(3)
(b) of the Patients’ Rights Directive (cited supra note 2) which refers to: “(i) the financial bal-
ance of the Member State’s social security system; and/or (ii) the planning and rationalisation 
carried out in the hospital sector to avoid hospital overcapacity, imbalance in the supply of hos-
pital care and logistical and financial wastage, the maintenance of a balanced medical and hos-
pital service open to all, or the maintenance of treatment capacity or medical competence on the 
territory of the concerned Member State.”
85. The category of reasons of overriding public interest is open-ended. Thus in DocMorris, 
cited supra note 14, the Court added “the objective of ensuring that the provision of medicinal 
products to the public is reliable and of good quality” (para 106).
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usually legitimated under the public interest banner. For instance in Kohll the 
Court stated: “It must be recalled that aims of a purely economic nature cannot 
justify a barrier to the fundamental principle of freedom to provide services 
…. However, it cannot be excluded that the risk of seriously undermining the 
financial balance of the social security system may constitute an overriding 
reason in the general interest capable of justifying a barrier of that kind.”86
4.2. No central role for efficiency
In contrast to the Treaty competition rules, efficiency goals or the maximiza-
tion of consumer welfare are not major priorities in the assessment of the public 
interest in the field of freedom of establishment. It is admittedly not the aim 
of the free movement rules to ensure that national objectives are pursued in an 
economically sound manner. Instead it is assumed that the governments of the 
Member States are in charge of an adequate ordering of public interests and 
the manner in which they are pursued. Consequently cohesion and solidarity, 
even if not always clearly defined as public objectives, have traditionally been 
the main values to be taken into account. Hence, drawing up and implementing 
health policy goals, as well as their planning and organization, and their financ-
ing, and, finally, maintaining “the unity and balance of the system”,87 remain 
primarily a national preserve.
4.3. No central role for good governance
Arguably, the goal of realizing an internal market in any particular sector is 
not just about securing a procedural or good governance approach with a right 
to reasoned decisions and a right of appeal, as has been predominantly the 
main requirement imposed on national governments in the patient mobility 
cases. It is also about ensuring that States apply sound economics to their 
healthcare decisions. The application of the free movement rules inevitably 
occurs as a result of what have been referred to as “constitutional asymmetries”,88 
and the question arises whether a more economics-based approach to their 
application could offer a better way to tackle this problem. As the stated objec-
tive of the free movement rules is the realization of an internal market, and if 
the concept of market access is to be taken seriously, it surely follows that 
86. Kohll, cited supra note 2, para 41. Likewise Decker, cited supra note 2, para 39.
87. Commission v. Germany (hospital pharmacies), cited supra note 9, para 56.
88. Mossialos et al., “Introduction” in Mossialos et al., op. cit. supra note 10, with reference 
to Scharpf, “The European social model: coping with the challenges of diversity”, 40 JCMS 
(2002), 645. The notion behind this is that the EU has instruments to promote market efficiency, 
but not to promote social protection.
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there ought to be room for more economic arguments in the establishment 
context. This does not necessarily mean that there should be an unquestioned 
assumption that market access is beneficial as such. Rather, it means that where 
assumptions are made, they should be tested on the basis of economic theories 
which offer useful insights beyond bland declarations in the name of some 
unspecified or ill-determined public interest objective.
 One possible approach could be to expose the economic assumptions under-
lying the model that is implicit in the public policy justifications invoked to 
date and to identify, at a minimum, inconsistencies, as a counterpoint against 
the vague claims of the “unity and balance of the system”.89
 A second approach may be to introduce more a rigorous cost/benefit anal-
ysis in the context of the proportionality test: surely if one party provides data 
to this effect the burden of proof at the other end of the scales will increase 
too? If this is correct, it appears entrants’ interest to do so.
 In both cases it appears obvious that benefits shown have to be expressed 
as benefits to the consumer – at least in terms of a fair share.
4.4. Market failures
This in turn raises the question whether public intervention is only justified 
when the market fails – its aim would be either to boost market forces, balance 
power between market parties, or to achieve what it is assumed that the market 
cannot do. Market failure is not a tightly defined concept, because it can include 
the delivery of goods and services at levels that are considered publicly 
optimal:90 hence there is of course still room for value judgements. Although 
it is not always straightforward to determine, this does not mean that the con-
cept of market failure is not useful. The Commission’s April 2009 draft com-
munication proposing common principles for an economic assessment of the 
compatibility of State aid under Article 87(3) EC provides some useful initial 
guidance in this respect.91 What is required alongside the concept of market 
failure is the corrective concept of government failure. This means that although 
private markets may create certain problems, we should take into account the 
risk that public solutions may lead to further problems that are possibly worse.92
89. Dermoestética, cited supra note 19, para 39; Hartlauer, cited supra note 13, para 63.
90. This is the broad view of market failure from the perspective of welfare economics. 
According to classic economics, market failure is limited to a market that fails to produce an effi-
cient outcome both in static and dynamic terms as a result of market power, externalities, public 
goods, imperfect information or property rights. 
91. At <ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/reform/economic_assessment_en.pdf>
92. Cf. Lipsey and Lancaster, “The General Theory of the Second Best”, 24 The Review of 
Economic Studies (1956), 11.
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5. Conclusion
Our overview of the recent EU case law on freedom of establishment in the 
healthcare sector indicates that despite its broad interpretation of Article 49 
TFEU (ex 43 EC) to incorporate non-discriminatory measures, the Court 
remains reluctant to tackle the complexities of national health systems. As 
Hartlauer 93 confirms, this might be otherwise if the Member State itself has 
already elected for a mixed system – as in one way or another many are com-
pelled to do by the increasing demands on healthcare. Nevertheless much of 
the Court’s case law suggests that the Court suspects that, by their nature, 
market access solutions are not to be trusted in healthcare matters, due to the 
inherently corrupting effect of the profit motive. If this stance solidifies, it 
would certainly be a profoundly problematic position for the Court to adopt 
in a Community which is, after all, based on the principle of an internal market 
(if not the principle of free and open markets). On the other hand, as the BUPA 
case shows, the European courts may be open to market-based solutions in 
healthcare that are explicitly designed to incorporate solidarity – a category 
that is likely to grow in importance with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty 
with its panoply of goals, values and principles.94 Meanwhile, the German 
Constitutional Court recently cited Sodemare to justify the claim in its Lisbon 
Decision that the essential locus of decision-making power on this count 
remains national, and social exceptions to the market freedoms continue to 
exist in the form of imperative reasons of general interest.95
  However it is generally acknowledged that compared to the comparatively 
simple command and control systems of public provision, markets need more 
regulation as a framework for efficient transactions (to reduce transaction 
costs). The need for rules is therefore likely to be inescapable in systems that 
are in transition and in search of a balance between solidarity, social cohesion 
and efficiency. What is at issue is the nature of these rules. What is required 
above all is a clearer definition of the public interest as a basis for strictly pro-
portionate regulatory intervention. At present, in the absence of harmoniza-
tion, the Court appears to leave it entirely up to the national authorities to strike 
this balance. While this cautious approach may be understandable given the 
sensitivities involved, it should not be overlooked that in practice this primar-
ily means serving vested national interests. In this respect it is illustrative how 
93. Hartlauer, cited supra note 13.
94. BUPA, cited supra note 11; Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union 
and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 Dec. 2007, O.J. 2007, 
C 306/1.
95. BVerfG, 2BvE 2/08 of 30 June 2009, paras. No. 1–421, at para 398, Sodemare, cited 
supra note 14, alongside a similar reference to inter alia Müller-Fauré, cited supra note 73.
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many of the cases discussed here resulted from challenges lodged by profes-
sional organizations keen to defend the status quo.
 What could give? There appear to be at least three possibilities, which are 
not mutually exclusive.
 First, the current tentative steps towards harmonization may herald future 
improvement. The Patients’ Rights Directive will lead to the development of 
costing principles for hospital services, and standards relating to the right to 
an informed choice (including on quality and performance in terms of out-
comes) that will highlight relative performance and inefficiencies across the 
EU. This could increase pressures for change – including market entry. Fur-
ther harmonization could result. Such changes however are time consuming.
 Second, in our view the case law has evolved sufficiently to request the 
Commission to provide an “interpretative communication” on the application 
of the Treaty rules to the health sector, in the interest of consistency and pre-
dictability.96
 Third, on the economic side in the meantime a more robust approach to test-
ing the assumptions put forward on both sides of the debate would be a sig-
nificant advance for all concerned, but most importantly, patients.
 When assessing the Court’s recent record on the application of the funda-
mental freedoms to the health sector, we should not forget that only a decade 
ago, in Sodemare the Court found no infringement of Article 43 EC at all, but 
by 2009, in DocMorris, a public health defence was required even for non-
discriminatory measures, involving a proportionality test based on consistency 
and rationality. This should be seen as a significant advance, or at least as “one 
step beyond”.
 If the proportionality test is refined to embrace a consistency standard under-
pinned by a more robust economic analysis this could pave the way to sub-
stantial improvements in guaranteeing the application of the free movement 
rules in the health sector. This need not challenge Member States’ authority 
over the standard of health protection at all. At most, it could open up debate 
on the organization of healthcare services delivery, while potentially improv-
ing health outcomes. Finally, it might well serve to introduce a more objective 
approach to defining the public interest and to ensure a more robust examina-
tion of the various and often vested interests involved.
96. Cf. Commission Communication on the consequences of the Court’s judgment in Cassis 
de Dijon, O.J. 1980, C 256; Commission Communication of cross border services, O.J. 1993, 
C 334; Commission Communication on concessions, O.J. 2000, C 121. For an analysis of the 
value of such texts cf. Smulders, “Institutional aspects of European Commission guidance in the 
area of antitrust law”, (2009) Competition Policy International, 25. 
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